CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTS.*
Among the duties of governments, none is more imperativethan that of fulfilling their obligations. But, as none can
rightly be judge in his own cause, this duty cannot be carried
out without some means of judicially ascertaining the obligation.
"Where there is a right there is a remedy," we are told;
and while the rule may not be absolutely without exception, a
right without a legal remedy for its violation stands on no
very firm footing. The duty of the government to fulfil its
obligations, therefore, necessarily includes that of providing
adequate means for an impartial adjudication whether an
obligation in a given case exists: United States v. Klein, I3Wall. 128, 144.
Plain as this truth seems, it was a long time in receiving
practical acknowledgment by the Federal government.
The exemption of the sovereign from suit in his own courts
was a survival from a past state of things, without the slightest
present reason for existence. "It is difficult," says our highest
tribunal (United States v. Lee, io6 U. S. 196, 2o6), "to see
on what solid foundation of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests." The maxim "the King can do no,
wrong" has been declared (Langford v. United States, IoI U.
S. 341) to have no existence in this country "in reference to
the government of the United States, or of the several States,
or of any of their officers." Yet while the maxim has itself
been repudiated, some of its most odious practical applications
continued to be upheld and enforced, as indeed they are to a
considerable extent to this day.
No neglect to provide for suits against the government can
be charged against the framers of the Constitution. Prominent
among the subjects enumerated for the exercise of the judicial
power are " controversies to which the United States shall be
*Read at the World's Congress of Jurisprudence and Law Reform, at
Chicago, Augttst 7, 1893.
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a party" (Art. 3, § 2). It was never doubted that this embraced cases in which the United States were defendant as well
as plaintiff. Yet for upwards of half a century the constitutional grant proved ineffective for lack of legislation providing
a tribunal in which the suit could be brought.
Judge Story, writing in 1833, shows his usual ardor for a
practical administration of justice which shall meet the ideal
conception of right. " It has sometimes," he says (Commentaties on the Constitution, § 1678), "been thought that this is a
serious defect in the organization of the judicial department of
the national government. It is not, however, an objection to
the Constitution itself, but it lies, if at all, against Congress for
not having provided (as it is clearly within their constitutional
authority to do) an adequate remedy for all private grievances
of Ois sort in the Courts of the United States."
this failure of justice met with no remedy till 1855, when a.
court was created (by Act of 1855, Feb. 24, Ch. 122; 10 U. S.
Siatutes-at-Large, 612 ; Rev. Statutes, § 1049) "for the investigation of claims against the United States." At first, however,
the " Court of Claims" was a court only in name, its functions
being merely recommendatory and advisory. In 1863, however, it received (by Act of 1863, March 3, Ch. 92; 12 U. S.
Statutes-at-Large, 765) authority to render final judgments for
or against the United States, and has since taken rank with
those ".tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," which Congress is empowered to " ordain and establish" (United States
v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 145).
In 1887 concurrent jurisdiction of suits against the United
States was vested in the District and Circuit Courts of the
United States in a limited class of cases, "where the amount
of the claim does not exceed $iooo," and in the Circuit
Courts "where the ambunt of the claim exceeds $IOOO and
does not exceed $io,ooo " (by Act of I887, March 3, Ch.
359 § 2 ; I Supp. Rev. Statutes U. S. 559), though comparatively few such suits are in practice instituted in these courts.
Three points are noticeable in this legislation :
I. The jurisdiction is limited to claims arising ex contractu.
Claims arising from torts are expressly excluded (by § I, of
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the Act of 1887, supra) from judicial determination, though
sometimes referred by special legislation, generally in cases of
collision resulting from alleged negligence in the navigation of
public vessels: Case of the Schooner Ada A. Andrews, 18 Stat.
L. 201 ; Sampson v. United States, 12 C. Cls. 480; Case of
the Schooner Flight, 19 Stats. L. 503 ; Thrush v. United States,
14 C. Cls. 435 ; Case of the Schooner Don Pedro, 2o Stat. L.
483; Prescott v. United States, 19 C. Cls. 684; Case of the
Steamer I. N. Bunton, 25 Stat. L. 1334; Walton v. United
States, 24 C. Cls. 372.
2. The jurisdiction is limited to money demands, and does
not embrace suits for specific performance or the restitution of
property, real or personal: United States v.Jones, 131 U. S. I.
These, again, are sometimes made the subject of special reference in particular cases, (Hot Springs Cases, 92 U. S. 698;
Myers v. United States, 24 C. CIs. 448), though as to land in
the possession of the government, claimed by a private individual, an action of ejectment against the officer in possession
is often an available remedy: United States v. Lee, io6 U. S.
196.
3. Interest is not allowed, unless the contract expressly
stipulates for it: Rev. Statutes U. S. § Io9I.
Turning now from claims against the Federal government
to claims against the several States, we find the greatest
diversity between the constitutions and statutes of different
States. The whole subject is entirely within the control of the
State, for the sovereign prerogative of exemption from suit
without its own consent, except in a very limited class of cases
in the Supreme Court, belongs to each State as fully as to the
United States.
It is true that by the original Constitution of the United
States a State might be sued by original process in the
Supreme Court of the United States, by a citizen of any other
State, or of a foreign nation.
This liability to suit was, however, taken away by the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Supreme Court has recently
expressed serious doubts whether the State was, by a correct
construction of the Constitution, thus subject to suit, even
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before the adoption of the Amendment: Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U. S. I.

However this may be, there is no question that no State can
now be sued in any court without its consent, either by its
own citizens, or by those of other States, or of foreign
The only liability of a State to be sued in the
nations.
Supreme Court is, by the United States (United States v. Texas,
143 U. S. 621), by a sister State (Rkode Island v. Massachu.sells, 12 Pet. 657; Floridav. Georgia, 17 How. 478; Alabama
v. Georgia, 23 How. 505; Virginia v. West Virginia, I I Wall.
39; Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503), or by a foreign government.
The litigation, too, must be a bona fide one between these
high parties, not a colorable attempt by the plaintiff State to
enforce obligations owed by the defendant State to private
-citizens, and assigned by them merely for the purpose of
suit : New Hampshire v. Louisiana, IO8 U. S. 76. And if a
State has by its Constitution or laws subjected itself to suit in
its own courts it may at any time withdraw the.right even as
.to pending cases : Beers v. Arkansas, 2o How. 527; Railroad
Co. v. Tennessee, ioi U. S. 337; Raih'oad Co. v. Alabama,
IOI U.S. 832.
While some of the State constitutions (as Indiana, Idaho,
and Nevada,) expressly provide for the bringing of suits
against the State, others on the contrary (as Alabama) as
-expressly forbid that the State shall ever be made a defendant
in any suit at law or in equity. In a majority the antiquated
rule prevails that no suit can be brought against the sovereign :
Schweitzer v. United States, 21 C. Cls. 303, 307. In some a
a limited right of suit prevails, as in Minnesota, where the
State, though in all general respects exempt from suit, may
be made a defendant in any action affecting real estate with a
view to a partition thereof.
Other States, however, make liberal provisions for the maintenance of suits against themselves.
In Massachusetts the Superior Court has by statute jurisdiction of all claims against the Commonwealth. This, however, is held to be limited to claims arising ex contractu and
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not to extend to claims ex delicto: 1WHurdock ParlorGrate Co
v. Commonwealth, 152 Mass. 28. Not because the statute
limits the right of suit to claims arising on contract, but
because in case of tort no liability whatever arises; so that
the objection to the maintenance of an action upon tort
against the State does not result from want of jurisdiction, but
from absence of liability, a conclusion, as we shall see, curiously in opposition to that placed upon an Australian statute
almost identical in terms with that of Massachusetts.
Virginia in this respect claims the rank of the pioneer
State. " It has ever been the cherished policy of Virginia to.
allow to her citizens and others the largest liberty of suit
against herself, and there has never been a moment since
October, 1778, but two years and three months after she
became an independent State, that all persons have not
enjoyed this right by express statute" : Zigiginbotham'sExecutrix v. Commonwealth, 25 Grattan, 637.
West Virginia has, in this respect, followed the traditions of
the parent State and fieely permits suits against herself: Code
of West Virginia, Ch. 37, pp. 269, 270.
New York is among the most liberal of all the States. She
has a Board of Claims which, notwithstanding its name, is in
organization a strictly judicial tribunal having power to issue
subpoenas and to fine for contempt. Its practice is governed
by rules -similar to those in force in the Supreme Court of the
State, and appeals regularly lie from its decisions to the Court
of Appeals where the amount involved exceeds $5,00o.
Cost
are not awarded, but, on the other hand, interest seems in
practice to be regularly allowed: Sayre v. State, 128 N. Y_
622.
While the jurisdiction of this Board, in general,
extends only to claims arising e;r contractu, yet negligence in
the management of canals operated by the State is also recognized as a ground of liability : Sipple v. State, 99 N. Y. 284;
PBowen v. State, io8 N. Y. 166 ; Splittoif v. State, 1o8 N. Y.
205.
In no other class of cases, however, can negligence on
the part of the State or its officers 'e made a ground of State
liability.
Other States having provisions for the maintenance of suits,
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against themselves are North Carolina, Mississippi, South
Dakota, Idaho and Nevada.
California, however, seems now to have taken the lead of
all the States in the allowance of suit against herself. A
recent statute enacted February 28, 1893, provides as follows:
"All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the State not allowed by the
State Board of Examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms
and conditions herein named to bring suit thereon against the
State in any of the Courts of this State . . . of competent jurisdiction and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules
of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as
herein otherwise provided." The statute further expressly
provides for the allowance .of interest on all claims from the
time the obligation accrued.
Two points may be noticed in this legislation distinguishing
it from that of the United States on the same subject.
I. The allowance of suits against the government for negligence. The law defining the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims of the United States, expressly excludes claims sounding in tort nor does any other State of the Union allow such
suits except New York, and she -only for negligence in the
operation of canals.
The Federal Court of
2. The allowance of interest.
Claims is expressly prohibited from allowing interest "on any
claim up to the time of the rendition of judgment thereon,'"
"unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for the payment
of interest."
It is clear, therefore, that if the new law of California is
destined to receive as liberal a construction as its terms seem
to require, that State may be regarded as having now taken
the first place in inviting judicial settlement of controversies
to which she is herself the party defendant.
It may be stated, as a general, if not universal rule as to
suits against the States of the Union, as it certainly is as to
suits against the United States, that no execution can issue to
carry out a judgment, but the judgment creditor must await
an appropriation by the legislature. Except, however, in
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special cases, involving very large amounts, or where the
matter becomes the subject of political or partisan controversy,
provision is regularly made in the ordinary course of business
for the payment of judgments.
Passing now from our own Union to foreign nations the first
inquiry is naturally as to the law of that' country from which
our own jurisprudence is derived. The remedy afforded by
the law of England to the citizen having a demand against the
sovereign is known as the petition of right; and of this Blackstone says:
"And, first, as to private injuries: if any person has, in
point of property, a just demand upon the king, he must
petition him in his Court of Chancery, where his chancellor
will administer right as a matter of grace though not upon
compulsion. And this is entirely consonant to what is laid
down by the writers on natural law. 'A subject,' says Puffendoff, ' so long as he continues a subject, hath no way to oblige
his prince to give him his due, when he refuses it; though no
wise prince will ever refuse to stand to a lawful contract. And
if the prince gives the subject leave to enter an action against
him, upon such contract, in his own courts, the action itself
proceeds rather upon natural equity than upon the municipal
laws.' For the end of such actions is not to compel the
prince to observe the contract, but to persuade him " (I Blackstone's Commentaries, 243.)

Some remarks, however, of the celebrated commentator in
another part of his work (3 Blackstone's Commentartis, 256),
seem to limit the scope of this remedy to claims for the
recovery of specific property, real or personal, for he says that
it "is of use, where the king is in full possession of any hereditaments or chattels, and the petitioner suggests such a right as
controverts the title of the crown, grounded on facts disclosed
in the petition."
The petition of right, however, is a remedy apparently in
such infrequent use that it is difficult to institute 'a comparison
between its practical efficiency and that of a suit in the Court
of Claims in this country.
Leave to proceed must always be obtained by fiat of the
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Crown, which is not grantable of right, and is sometimes
refused.
It was even a doubtful question till recently, whether the
Crown were suable by petition of right for breach of contract.
True, the "Petitions of Right Act, i86o," simplified the
proceedings in such cases and assimilated them to those
between subject and subject; but that act was not to " be
construed to give to the subject any remedy against the
Crown in any case in which he would not have been entitled
to remedy before the passing of this Act."
But in 1874, the Queen's Bench, upon great consideration,
decided that such an action would lie for damages for breach
of contract: Thomas v. The Queen, L. R. Io Q. B. 3 !. The
great difficulty, however, which the court found in settling
this point, and the fact that the authorities leading to a conclusion favorable to the maintenance of the suit were " many
of them antiquated and conhected with forms of procedure
with which no one now alive is familiar," show the infrequency
of this remedy, in striking contrast with the constant occurrence of this kind of suits in the United States.
Facilities, too, are afforded the suitor in this country by
way of calls upon the executive departments for information
and papers (Rev. Statutes, U. S. § 1076) which are denied in
England, where no rule can be made upon a department of
the government for the production of papers desired by the
suppliant in a petition of right : Thomas v. The Qucen, L. R.
io Q. B. 44.
General Schenck while American Minister at London, by
direction of the State Department, made some inquiries regarding the prosectition of claims against Her Majesty's government, the result of which seems to have impressed him (Report of Hon. William Lawrence, House Report No: 134,
43rd Congress, 2nd sess. p. 191) with " the doubts and difficulties in the way of the prosecution of any such claim ;"an impression which appears to have some justification in the
facts.
The rule that "the King can do no wrong" prevents the
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maintenance of a petition of right or other direct remedy
against the Crown for negligence of public officers or servants: Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney-General, I Phillips,
3o6.

But an effective remedy exists in cases of collision of a
public with a private vessel, resulting in damage to the latter.
Here, as in admiralty a vessel is for many purposes personified and held responsible for damages inflicted by the negligence of her officers, a libel in rem is filed against the offending vessel. The court thereupon directs the register to write
to the Lords of the Admiralty asking the entry of an appearance on behalf of the Crown which is generally given, and the
proceedings are then conducted to decree as in other cases:
The Atlol, I W. Robinson, 382, cited and fully commented
on in The Siren, 7 "Wall. 152.
it is true that no warrant issues in these cases for the arrest
of the vessel of the Crown, but the proceedings are strictly
judicial ; the suits are instituted and conducted on the hypothesis that claims against the offending vessel are created by
the collision ; and, while the vessels are not taken into custody,
it is presumed that the government will at once satisfy a
decree rendered by its own tribunals in a case in which it has
voluntarily appeared.
So, too, where the construction and operation of public
works is under the charge of Boards or Commissioners invested with the necessary powers by acts of Parliament, and
error or neglect occurs, causing damage to individuals, the
Commissioners or members of. the Board are held liable, but
the damages are paid out of the public funds in their hands:
'ZcrseyDocks, Trnstees v. Gibbs, L. R., I H. L. (English &
Irish Appeals) 93 ; Addison on Torts, Ch. 16, s. 14 § 1043.
This, while in form resembling a suit against a municipal corporation, seems in substance to approach very closely to an
action against the government.
Many of the Colonies of England have extended the right
of suit against the Crown, which is in effect a suit against the
government of the Colony, far beyond the measure of redress
granted by the jurisprudence of the mother country.
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No more interesting example in this respect can be found
than in the Island of Ceylon, for instance. In that island a
ve:-\- extensive practice of suing the Crown had sprung
up and had been recognized in hundreds of decisions.
It is thought to have been derived from the Roman-Dutch
law in force in Ceylon prior to the British conquest in 1799.
Whether such suits were, in fact, allowed by that law seems
to be as a matter of legal history quite obscure.
The right wa- put on a firm basis, however, by a legislative
ordinance of the Colcny' adopted in 1868 which, while not
professing to originate the right of suit against the Crown,
confers jurisdiction of such suits upon the District Courts of
the Nland in s uch specific terns as to amount to a recognition
of the right. It was. therefore. sustained b the Privy Council
as a.:tho,'itv for the bringing of suits in that Colon-, against
the Crown Aj.pt v.
Ae'aL, -z,'c;zs
9 App. Cas. 57 I. The

jurisdiction, however, extends there only to cases of contract.
We are accustomed to look to Australia for striking and
successful experiments in law reform and we shall not be
disappointed if we expect there to find an ample measure of
ju-'tice accorded to the citizen having a demand against the
-overnment.

By a statute of New South -Wales (39 Victoria, No. 38),
entitled "An Act to enforce claims against the Colonial
.,overnment and to give costs in Crown suits," it is provided
that : Any person having or deeming himself to have anclaim or demand whatever against the government of this
colony-, ma- set forth the same in a petition to the Governor
praying him to appoint a nominal defendant in the matter of
such petition."
The Governor may then name a nominal defendant. but if
he fails to do so within one month, the Colonial Treasurer
shall be the nominal defendant.
In anx- action or suit under this act all necessary judgmnts. decrees and orders max' be given and made, and shall
include every species of relief, whether by way of specific
performance, or restitution of rights, for recovery of lands or
chattels, or payment of money or- damages."
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The Colonial Treasurer is t, pay all damages and costs
awarded in such cases out of any moneys in his hands legaily"
applicable thereto, '" and in the event of such payment not
being made within sixty day-s after demand execution may be
had for the amount, and the same may be levied upon any
property vested in the government of this Colony."
The Privy Council, upon the language of this statute,
remarks: Farui/ v. Boz'uzan, 12 Apo. Cas. 645. - Thus,
unless the plain words are to be restricted for any good reason,
a complete remedy is given to any person having or deeming
himself to have any just claim or demand whatever against
the government. These words are amply sufficient to include
a claim for damages for a tort committed by the local government by their servants."
The reason is then given for the distinction between the
Colonial law and that of England, as follows:
It must be borne in mind that the local governments in
the colonies, as pioneers of improvement, are frequently
obliged to embark in undertakings, which in other countries
are left to private enterprise, such for instance as the construction of railways, canals, and other works, for the construction of which it is necessary to employ many inferior
officers and workmen.
If therefore, the maxim that ' the
King can do no wrong,' were applied to Colonial governments
in the wa3 now contended for by the appellants, it would
work much greater hardship than it does in England."
To me the most remarkable feature of this legislation is not
so much its broad abrogation of the rule that the King can
do no wrong," as its still bolder subjection of the government
of the Colony to the issuance of an execution in case of nonpayment of the judgment within sixty days.
In England and in this country- alike, the - proceedings end
with the recovery of the judgments. After they are obtained,
it depends in England on the Parliament, and in this country
on Congress, whether or not they shall be paid ":
),itd
States v. O'A'cfc. I I Wall. 178.
The suitor even after obtaining his judgment must sti!l
approach the sovereign on bended knee, a " suppliant " as he

CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTS.

is most appropriately termed in England, a "petitioner" in
this country, with a humble prayer for payment of the sum
But the Australian suitor may
judicially found due him.
of right demand prompt payment of his judgment and may
seize the Colonial property in case of default with little more
ceremony or delay than he would that of John Doe or
Richard Roe.
In the Straits Settlements (Attorne'-Generalv. 11e4 'mss, 13
App. Cas. i92) and in New Zealand (The Queen v. ll1iams,
9 App. Cas. 418) suits against the Crown, both on contracts and torts, are freely permitted.
Turning now to our closest neighbor among the Queen's
dominions we find that in Canada; suits against the Crown on
contract are freely allowed: HJumphrc' v. The Queen. 20
Canada Sup. Ct. 591. And the government has been held
liable for damages to water-works caused by the construction
of a government dam : The Qucen v. St. John MIattr Commissioneis, 19 Canada Sup. Ct. 125.
A recent statute gives to the Court of Exchequer express
jurisdiction of " every claim against the Crown arising out of
any death or injury to the person or property on any public
work, resulting from the negligence of any officer or servant
of the Crown, while acting within the scope of his duties or
employment."
Whether this statute extends the application of the maxim
respondeat superior in its full measure to the acts of the officers
and servants of the Crown or Colonial government is perhaps
as yet unsettled : The Queen v. .3artin, 2o Canada Sup. Ct.
240.
The language of the statute is certainly more farreaching than that of New South Wales, which has certainly
accomplished this result, and it would seem therefore that our
northern neighbor has fairly come up to the position, which
neither England nor this country has as yet been willing to
adopt, that the government cannot assume the powers and
privileges of an owner of property without also being subjected
to the responsibilities incident to such ownership.
In following the law of England and of the countries which
are or have been her colonies and have derived their juris-
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prudence from her, we can have no difculty in ascertaininwhether the remedy given by the law againit the sovereign in
case of an alleged breach of contract, or any other claim, is of
a judicial character or is a mere administrative process of
accounting. The distinction between a judicial court and an
executive department is too sharply drawn in Common Law
countries to render it possible to confound one with the other.
In France and other Civil Law countrics, the admniitrative
lav is something so different firom the ordinary ciki.l law that
it is not always easy to say whether the reied - all,,wcd
against the government is what we sh,)uld consider a judicial
remedy or i- an administrative process similar to the proceedins before the Auditors and Comptrollers of the Treasury
Department of the United States.
France has her administrative tribunals in which alone controversies pertaining to administration are to be adjudged
and while these tribunals partake of the nature of courts they
are also perhaps to some extent governed by an official spirit,
so that suits in them might not in all respects be regarded in
English law as the equivalent of a judicial remedy: Dicey, Lzaz
of the Constitutionl, 307. To what extent the remedy afforded
by the laws of France to those having claims against the
government is a practical, speedy and efficient one as compared with the petition of right in England, a suit against the
Crown in her colonies, or a suit in the Court of Claims in this
country, it is impossible for a foreigner to say.
The distinction between administrative law and the ordinary
civil law of the land became sharply marked in France at the
time of the Revolution. The National Convention at that
time decreed an annulment of all proceedings and judgments
which had taken place in the judicial tribunals against the
members of the administrative corps and committees, on claims
for property seized, or arising out of revolutionary taxes, or
out of any other acts of administration, and imposed upon
these tribunals repeated prohibitions against taking cognizance
of any acts of administration of whatever character.
Forcible grounds are assigned by writers on administrative axv for this separation of administrative firom civil tri-
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bunals, some of which are as follows : Cotdlf, Droit Administratf,283, 284.

i. That matters of controversy pertaining to administration
can be best judged by magistrates having exact knowledge
and full experience in such matters and that the order -to be
followed in public works, and the details of accountability
would frequently be of a character foreign to the knowledge
of an ordinary judge.
2. That such cases could be more promptly expedited by
the administrative authority, which has at hand all the elements
of litigation, all the officers, engineers, bureaus, agents.. &c.,
and in this way the proceedings would be as much more
rapid as they are more certain and complete than those of the:
ordinay tribunals.
3. That the result in the doctrines of the administrative
authority will be a unity of views, a harmony of principles
which it would be impossible to obtain from ordinary judges.
The rules of law applied to claims against the government
are not in France always the same as those which would be
applied to cases between individuals. Thus in suits between
individuals on contracts, gains prevented are as legitimate
elements of recovery as are losses incurred and the same rule.
is applied in this country to suits against the government.
But in France losses incurred are alone considered as a propermeasure of recovery; and profits of'which a contractor has
been deprived by a breach of contract on the part of the:
government do not appear to be allowed: Dicey, Law of theConstitution, citing Vivien, Etudes Admninistrati'e, I, pp. 140142).
In one respect the government of France must be regarded
as having placed itself upon a very high plane of justice to its.
citizens. This is in its dealings with war claims.
Immediately after the Franco-Prussian War the National
Asscmbly passed laws for the indemnification of all persons;
who had suffered losses during the German Invasion. The.-e
laws were " designed to cause the whole nation to aid int
making good the material damagcs of all kinds caused bthc war."
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In the administration of this law "the most liberal spirit
presided over the application of the principle of indemnification. No distinction was made ol account of the causes of
the damages. All persons who had suffered material losses
in consequence of the war were allowed to present their
claims, whether for war contributions, fines, or anything of the
kind." "It may be said that there is no kind of damage
resulting from war for which relief has not been granted, if not
in full, at least in a certain measure, and that without respect
Foreigners, Germans as well as others, were
of persons.
allowed to receive a share of the indemnities granted, whether
these had been appropriated to the reparation of losses resulting from the war, properly so called, or to that of losses cau.-ed
bv the insurrection of the commune." " France has always
taken the most liberal standpoint in granting indemnities after
*civil wars " : Letter of the Duke Decazes to Minister Washburne, House Report No. 13 4,4 3 d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 75, 76.
Mr. Hoffinan, then acting as Minister at Paris, in transmitting information on this subject, well says: " A captious
spirit might suggest that this was intended as a hint to us to
do likewise " (h. p. 74).
Other countries in which the Civil Law prevails have their
systems of administrative law, and in one form or another
make ample provision for the adjustment of all demands of
private individuals against the government: Id. passim: Dicey,
Law of the Constitution, 303 ; Broz'n v. United States, 5 C. Cls.
571 ; Lobsig-er v. United States, ; C. Cls. 687; j1Iolima v. United
States, 9 C. Cls. 269.
Claims of aliens against governments are often settled
through the agency of mixed International Commissions.
While such Commissions are admirable instrumentalities for
the settlement of great national controversies, like the Behring
Sea question, they are not very satisfactory tribunals for the
adjudication of private claims.
The ideas of International Law prevailing in one Commission
may be totally different from those governing another. Their
expenses are large,-sometimes disproportionately so to the
amount of business transacted.
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And in more than one instance the defendant government
has made charges of fraud, and demanded whether with
justice this is not the place to inquire a re-examination of so
much of the proceedings as adversely affected her: 22 U, S.
Statutes-at-Large, 6431; 27 Id. 409, 410. With the adoption
by every country of a complete system of remedial justice, in
whose due execution foreign governments and theif citizens
could have confidence, the necessity for these temporary and
exceptional tribunals would disappear; and there would be no
more occasion for diplomatic intervention in the settlement of
claims against foreign governments, than in that of claims
against private citizens of a foreign nation.
This brief review of the law and practice of different
countries in the settlement of claims against governments
naturally suggests some reflections looking to the improvement of our own policy in this respect. In the very forefront
of any such suggestions, I would put the idea of an absolute
exclusion of all dealing on the part of the legislative authority
with special cases.
Congress, under the Constitution, is organized with reference to the great subjects of national legislation. It has every
facility for full inquiry, thorough debate, and right decision on
those topics. But it is not a court and has not the organization or the machinery, even if it had the time or the temper,
for the adjudication of private rights.
The limits of a session are far too brief for the full consideration of the important measures of general public interest
affecting the finance, the commerce, the public health, and the
diplomatic relations of the country and the other great interests confided to the charge of Congress. That a national
legislature pressed with such public duties should undertake,
in addition, to pass upon the justice of private claims ranging
from millions in amount down to such demands as for the
value of a horse or a hundred cords of wood, is such an
absurdity as to be almost incredible were it not unhappily a
matter of daily experience during the sessions of Congress.
No other legislature in the world attempts such a thing. Not
one in ten of the claims reported to the House of Represen-
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tatives by its Committees are ever, considered by that body,
those which are being usually called up by unanimous consent or under a motion to suspend the rules.
Nor is this condition of things more regretted by any
than by conscientious members of the House themselves.
A member of the Committee on claims or war claims
will for a whole session devote himself with praiseworthy
attention to duty and painstaking care to the examination of
claims coming before his Committee. He will probably find
little difficulty in getting his recommendations adopted by
his Committee, and by them reported to the House. WVhen,
however, he sees week after week, and month after month,
pass by, and his carefully digested reports completely ignored,
or even if called up for unanimous consent, defeated by a
hasty, passionate, or unintelligent objection, he may well grow
discouraged, and become so disgusted with the whole system
as to be unwilling to continue the work of Sisyphus, rolling
the stone up the hill only to see it roll down again. Under
such disheartening circumstances the only wonder is that the
-work of these Committees is so well and thoroughly done as
it generally is.
Nor is the evil much remedied by the passage of such laws
as those of 1883 and 1885, (1883, Iarch 3, ch. 116; 1885,
Jan. 20, ch. 25 ; I Supp. Rev. Statutes U. S. 403, 471 ; and the
similar provisions of 1887, March 3, ch. 359, §112, 14; I

Supp. Rev. Statutes U. S. 56 1, 562) conferring upon the Court
-of Claims a jurisdiction of an "ancillary" or " advisory"
character (In re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222, 226) under which
the Court finds facts and conclusions of law or both, and
merely reports them for further action. Such laws put the
.cart before the horse. Instead of defining with precision the
liability of the United States, they provide for a litigation,
which determines nothing and is binding upon no one. They
are unjust to the claimants in inviting them into the courts to
establish their claims without affording the slightest security
for the attainment of any substantial result in case of their
"success in the litigation. They are equally unjust to the go'ernment in not securing it against the re-assertion of claims
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judicially held to be unjust. Allowed claims amounting to
many thousands of dollars are still awaiting action in Congress, as after being reported they stand in no better legal
position than before, though doubtless-and most justly-with
a great moral advantage. Even the facts found have been
subjected to re-examination, although the whole organization
of Congress makes it impossible that it should with any hope
of success turn itself into a tribunal for the adjudication of
disputed questions of fact, and although even the Supreme
Court has refused to look beyond the facts found by the
Court of Claims. "The findings of the Court of Claims
furnish the facts we are to consider and we cannot look beyond
them. For the purpose of this case they import absolute
verity and conclude both parties:" Desmare v. United States,
93 U. S. 6Io.
The true field for the exertion of the powers of Congress
on the subject of private claims should be found in defining
the liability of the government and the jurisdiction of the
court or courts which should adjudicate upon special cases.
This is a field for statesmanship worthy of the ablest minds
in either House of the national legislature. Its proper exercise would remit to the courts for absolute and final decision
all claims or demands of whatever character against the
United States.
Those having claims well founded within the principles
defined would obtain the substantial fruit of their litigation in
a full judgment in their favor. Those whose claims ciearly lay
out.ide of the field of relief defined by the law, would upon
proper advice of counsel be saved the expense and trouble of
bringing their cases before the courts. On the other -hand,
those whose claims were sufficiently doubtful to warrant a
submission to the courts, and who are there denied relief, would
be out of court forever.
Congress would thus be relieved of the constantly increasing
pressure of appeals by defeated suitors to reverse the judgments of the courts against them, while on the other hand the
defeated suitor would himself go about his business, instead of
haunting the doors of Congress for years and years to go to
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his grave in penury and anguish, as has been the fate of many
a claimant before Congress, weary and sore with that deferred
hope that makes the heart sick.
Nor can it be urged that the task of defining the liability of
the government is one of insuperable difficulty. \Doubtless
there are difficulties in questions of governmental liability,
owing to the peculiarity of the various branches of the administrative machinery of the government, but after all, the underlying principles do not radically differ from those governing
the transactions of private parties.
Again and again have matters which were thought to be
proper subjects for special legislative action been brought
within the scope of general law and always with the greatest
advantage to both the government and the citizen.
Acts of attainder were at one time defended on the ground
that the ordinary criminal law might not be sufficient to reach
the case of some grave public offenders, and that the power
should be reserved to the legislature to enact special measures
of punishment: .- acazday, Histoij , of England (Harpers'
edition), Vol. 5, p. 199.
Special divorce laws were once
regarded as within the legitimate sphere of legislative activity :
J_1an'nrd v. Hill, 125 U. S. 19o. But in both cases a sound
philosophy amply supported by experience has brought the
subject within the domain of general law, and special cases of
these classes have long since been banished fiom the halls of
parliament and legislature, and each case is dealt with by
courts acting under general statutes and in accordance with
established precedents.
That claims against the government should be equally
brought within the scope of general legislation, and that all
arbitrary, special and exceptional measures of relief should
be entirely done away with, must be, I think, to anyone who
attentively pursues the proceedings of Congress on this subject, a truism so forcible as only needing to be stated to
command assent.
With the liability of the government defined in advance by
laws equally applicable to all, and with an impartial tribunal
meting out equal justice to every suitor irrespective of political
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influence or personal solicitation, no citizen can have any just
ground of complaint.
Hardships will indeed occur, but
hards-hips are inseparable from every system of human justice.
Better, far better, were it that occasional instances of that kind
should happen, than that the time and attention of the national
legislature should be in such large measure occupied, as it is
now, in the consideration of purely private and personal interests to the necessary neglect of the vastly greater public duties
committed to its charge.
Some suggestions may not be out of place as to what new
legislation on claims should include.
Our laws touching suits against the government on contract give the citizen ordinarily the same measure of redress
that he would have were he suing a private defendant. A
singular exception to this rule is the prohibition against the
allowance of interest, except where expressly stipulated for by
name. But in cases where the payment of a specific sum at
a definite time is agreed upon, the damage arising from the
delay in payment constitutes a grievance as actual as the nonpayment of the principal sum. The redress for this grievance
given by the ordinary law of the land is the allowance of legal
interest.
There seems to be no good reason outside of legal tradition why the government should not pay damages for the
detention of money where it has failed to pay a certain liquidated sum on a stipulated date. Certainly the governmentcontractor who has been sorely pressed and perhaps ruined by
himself having to borrow at interest to replace in his business
the amount which the government should long ago have paid
him will derive small comfort from being told in the language
of our horn-books that " to know an injury and to redress it
are inseparable in the royal breast," or as it is often expressed
in this country that " the government is always ready and
willing to pay its debts;' and that therefore the theory of
the law-wide enough in this instance from the actual factis that if he had only demanded the payment of his debt, he
would have secured it.
The absolute exclusion from the jurisdiction of the courts
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of all claims sounding in tort, works great hardship in a country where the government is the owner and manager of so
much property, and is conducting such vast public improvements in connection, particularly, with rivers and harbors. It
is derived from the maxim of the law of England that "the
King can do no wrong," a maxim which forbids the application of the rule, respondeat supei-ior-to the sovereign power,
although even in that country as we have seen this application
of the maxim is treated as a mere local rule of English law
and as inapplicable to many of her Colonies.
Attorney-General Cushing in a profound opinion rendered
in 1855 draws a wide distinction between the classes of government officers for whose acts the government should or should
not be held responsible.
"In the transaction of public affairs there are two classes of
officers, one employed in the collection of the revenue and the
care of the public property, who represent the proprietary
interest of the government, and another class who are the
agents of society itself, and are appointed by the government
only in its relation or capacity of parenspa'ite. For the acts
of the former, the government holds itself responsible in many
cases, because their acts are performed for the immediate
interest of the government. But for the acts of the latter, no
government holds itself pecuniarily responsible. It provides
means to make them personally responsible, or to punish
them for malfeasance in office, and in so doing it does all
which the people have by their constitution and laws required
of the government:" 7 Opinions of Attorneys-General, 227.
(See also the able reports of Senator Pike on the Case ofJohn
Williams, Sen. Rep. 825, 4 9 th Cong. Ist Sess., and of Senator
Hoar on the Case of the Steamer I. X Bunton, Sen. Rep.
2692, 5oth Cong. 2d Sess., both holding the same view).
And in the same line, Judge Cooley, evidently repudiating
the application of the royal maxim to our government, says:
"Even the State or general government may be guilty of
individual wrongs, for while each is a sovereign it is a corporation also, and as such is capable of doing wrongful acts.
The difficulty here is with the remedy, not with the right. No
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sovereign is subject to suits, except with his own consent.
But either this consent is given by a general law, or some
tribunal is established with power to hear all just claims; or,
if neither of these is done, the tort remains, and it is always to
be presumed that the legislative authority will make the proper
provision for redress when its attention is directed to the
injury: " CoolZ,' on Torts, 122.
It is time that our government should take rank with those
progressive countries which have banished the idea, worthy
only of a despot, that governments may enjoy all the advantages and privileges connected with the ownership of property,
while at the same time they evade the responsibilities inseparably inherent in such ownership.
A government can, no more than a private individual, with
justice repudiate "the great principle of the common law
which is equally the teaching of Christian morality, so to use
one's property as not to injure others."
The citizen injured by the mismanagement of government
property, whether by the collision of his vessel with a public
vessel of the United States or with the pier of a dam constructed and operated under the river and harbor appropriation acts ; by the falling of an unprotected floor in a government building; by the breaking of an elevator, or in any of
the other ways in which property may be so used as to cause
damage to others, should have a legal right of redress against
the government causing the injury, and should not be remitted
to the exercise of mere legislative favor and discretion.
I have not here undertaken to discuss the various special
classes of claims, many of them arising out of peculiar circuiastances not likely again to occur, such as the French Spoliation Claims, war claims for stores and supplies, or Indian
Depredation Claims. A discussion of the principles governing
each of these separate classes of claims would require a more
extended treatment than could be bestowed in the limits of
this paper. Besides, many of them have received treatment in
judicial decisions, s-uch as those of the Court of Claims (per
Davis, J.,) on the French Spoliation Claims, (21 C. Cls. 340,
22 C. Cls. I,) or Congressional reports, in a manner so able
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and exhaustive that I should despair of being able to add anything of value.
As to all of them, however, the general rule should apply,
that the liability of the government should in every instance
be strictly defined in advance, and a court or courts be invested
with full power to adjudicate finally upon every claim presented, leaving the result if favorable to the claimant a binding
adjudication of liability upon the United States, and if unfavorable an equally binding and decisive bar to all further claim.
In no instance should the legislature be invested with the
adjudication of special and particular cases, any more than it
should be charged with the re-examination of decisions of the
the courts in suits between private parties.
As to the character of the courts in which suits against the
government should be allowed, there is no denying the force
of the grounds assigned by French writers in favor of a
special tribunal or set of tribunals dealing exclusively with
questions pertaining to governmental liability. The circumstances are largely foreign in their character to cases coming
before ordinary courts of law; the elements of litigation are
far more accessible to a special tribunal than they are to the
ordinary courts; and a harmony and unity of views results
from a separation of the jurisdiction from that of the ordinary
courts which it would be hard to expect from numerous courts,
sitting at different places and under different influences, passing
upon the liability of the government. The courts, however,
passing upon such questions should be a portion of the regular judiciary of the country, irremovable and independent of
ofliwial influence.

Our Court of Claims in this respect offers perhaps a happy
medium between the separate semi-official tribunals of France;
and the English practice under which suits against the Crown
are brought before the same courts which deal with ca-es
between one citizen and another.
As steps proper for the completion of a system of remedial
justice in case of citizens having demands against the government, I should name the following:
I. A right of suit against the government (preferably in

CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTS.

one special tribunal or set of tribunals) extending to all cases
arising under the Constitution, or under any act of Congress
or regulation of an executive department, or under any contract express or implied, and also over all claims arising out
of torts committed through the mismanagement of property
owned or operated by the government.
2. In all cases whether of contract or of tort, a strict definition by legislative authority of the liability of the government, with jurisdiction on the part of the court or courts to
enter a final judgment in every case whether in favor of the
claimant or the government.
3. The allowance of interest, not only where it is expressly
stipulated for, but where it is fairly impliable from the nature
of the transaction, as in case of a failure to pay a liquidated
suni of money falling due at an appointed time.
4. The exclusion of all special or exceptional relief to any
claimant on the part of the legislative authority.
In .any legislation on this topic, the controlling idea should
be the removal of the rights of the citizen against his government from the sphere of arbitrary power, political partisanship or personal favoritism, into the domain of general law.
Gcorge A. King.
Washingtou, D. C.. 1893.

